In class today, the question was raised as to whether Bartleby’s speech is related to Buddhism. While of course there is no definite or fundamental relation between the two concepts, I believe Bartleby’s projection of a zone of indetermination resonates powerfully with certain elements introduced into Buddhism via Mahāyāna writings, specifically in the Vimalakīrti sutra.
“Then, the Licchavi Vimalakīrti asked those bodhisattvas, ‘Good sirs, please explain how the bodhisattvas enter the Dharma-door of nonduality!’” (Thurman 1976:73). Posed to the collection of bodhisattvas gathered to pay respects to the ailing Vimalakīrti, this brief but profound chapter creates concepts quite similar to Deleuze’s unpacking of Bartleby’s “being as being, and nothing more.” Keeping with the rest of the sutra, the chapter “The Dharma-Door of Nonduality” is constructed as a humorous yet dense conversation between legions of dutiful but bumbling bodhisattvas and the wise trickster figure Vimalakīrti.
The bodhisattva Śrīgandha declared, “‘I’ and ‘mine’ are two. If there is no presumption for a self, there will be no possessiveness. Thus, the absence of presumption is the entrance to nonduality…’
The bodhisattva Priyadarśana declared, ‘Matter itself is void. Voidness does not result from the destruction of matter, but the nature of matter is itself voidness. Therefore, to speak of voidness on the one hand, and of matter, or of sensation, or of intellect, or of motivation, or of consciousness on the other - is entirely dualistic. Consciousness itself is voidness…’
The bodhisattva Satyarata declared, “It is dualistic to speak of ‘true’ and ‘false.’ When one sees truly, one does not ever see any truth, so how could one see falsehood? Why? One does not see with the physical eye, one sees with the eye of wisdom… There, where there is neither sight nor nonsight, is the entrance into nonduality.” (73-76).
In parsing the meaning of these responses we must keep in mind that the sutra is essentially didactic; with each succeeding answer, more light is shed on the difficulty of separating oneself from the false binaries of language. While Śrīgandha’s answer is an extreme simplification of Buddhist teaching that obviously reifies positionality, as the responses go on the answers become more in line with the subtle variations that distinguish Mahāyāna Buddhism. No answer is recognized by Vimalakīrti as correct, however.
Then, the crown prince Mañjuśrī said to the Licchavi Vimalakīrti, “We have all given our own teachings, noble sir. Now, may you elucidate the teaching of the entrance into the principle of nonduality!”
Thereupon, the Licchavi Vimalakīrti kept his silence, saying nothing at all.
The crown prince Mañjuśrī applauded the Licchavi Vimalakīrti: “Excellent! Excellent, noble sir! This is indeed the entrance to the nonduality of the bodhisattvas. Here there is no use for syllables, sounds, and ideas” (77).
Again, while there are great philosophical divides between Deleuzian and Buddhist concepts, in this instance I believe the fundamental lesson is the same: language is a force of stratification. While Bartleby utilizes language of indeterminacy, in the context of the narrative of the chapter Vimalakīrti’s silence serves to replicate the same “growth of the nothingness of the will.” In both Vimalakīrti’s silence as well as Bartleby’s agrammaticality, there is the same act of non-action, the same response with no referent.
-Tammer
References
Thurman, Robert A. F. 1976 The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.